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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
flHP STBIUfflRPS PF RFFEILRTE REV I EN 
1. Did the trial court commit reversible error in 
concluding that defendant's felony conviction uia3 
admissible; 
fl. Pursuant to rule 609(a)(1), Utah Rules of 
Evidence? 
Under rule 609(a)(1), a felony conviction may be 
admitted to impeach the defendant's testimony only If the 
trial court determines that the probative value outweighs 
its prejudicial effect. State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325, 
1334 (Utah 1986). The trial court's weighing of these 
factors is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion; 
however, "whether a trial judge has exceeded the scope of 
the discretion granted to him or her is a legal question" 
and reviewed on appeal for correction of error. State v. 
Thurman. 816 P.2d 1256, 1270 n. 11 (Utah 1993) (clarifying 
State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991). 
6. Ge3pite Section 76-8-1002(2), Utah Code 
Annotated. 
The relevant procedure for felony jury trial with an 
habitual criminal charge Is as to I lows; "If a jury is 
impaneled, it shall not be told of the previous felony 
convictions or charge of being a habitual criminal. The 
trial on the felony committed ithin the state of Utah 
shall proceed as in other cases." Standard of review is 
abuss of discretI-n. 
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2. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant defendant 
a mistrial on the ground that Deputy Brewer's testimony was 
prejudicial and not cured by the trial court's instruction 
to the jury to disregard that testimony? 
fl trial court's denial of a motion for listrial will 
be upheld unless the court abused its discretion, To 
warrant reuersal defendant must show that testimony is so 
prejudicial as to deny him a fair trial. State u. Burk. 
839 P.2d 880, 883-84 (Utah flpp. 1992). 
3, Is there sufficient evidence to support defendant's 
conviction for theft of an operable motor vehicle? 
fl jury verdict is viewed in the light most favorable 
to upholding it and will only be reversed where reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted. 
State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992); State v. 
Jonas. 793 P.2d 902, 903-04 (Utah flpp.), cert denied. 804 
P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990); State v. Peters. 796 P.2d 708 (Utah 
Rpp. 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PR0UISI0HS. STATUTES. RULES 
Copies of statutes and rules determinative of this 
appeal are contained in the addendum. 
STRTEflEHT OF CRSE 
fl. Nature of the Case 
Defendant Uayne H. Gauger was charged by second 
amended information with theft of an operable motor vehicle 
in violation of Section 76-6-404, Utah Code Ann. and being 
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an habitual criminal in violation of Section 76-8-1001, 
Utah Code Ann. (Record 13-15). That information specified 
as the basi3 for the habitual criminal enhancement, a 1984 
Second Degree Felony conviction and commitment for 
Possession of a Stolen Uehicle; a 1988 Second Degree Felony 
conviction and commitment for Larceny; a 1991 Third Degree 
Felony conuiction and commitment for Burglary (R. 13-15). 
Defendant plead not guilty on December 8, 1993 and the 
matter ma3 set for jury trial. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On January 10, 1994, a jury trial was held in Seventh 
District Court with the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson 
presiding, R state witness, Grand County sheriff deputy 
Curt Brewer testified that when questioning defendant 
subsequent to his arrest, defendant stated he mas on parole 
from the Utah State Prison (Transcript 94). Defense counsel 
objected, was sustained and the jury told to disregard that 
statement (T.94). Rt the next recess, defense counsel 
mowed for a mistrial on the basis of Deputy Bremer's 
statement (T.99). The trial judge denied the motion (T, 
99-100). The trial court offered to and did later giue a 
curative instruction to the jury (Instruction Ho. 11, R. 
70). 
Defendant testified on direct (T. 107-110) and was 
cross-examined (T.110-123). During his cross-examination, 
defendant was questioned about prior felony convictions 
(T.116). Defense counsel requested a recess and the court 
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made a determination to allow further questioning on one of 
defendant's prior convictions (T. 116-122), The court 
ailowed defendant to be questioned about his prior burglary 
conviction. 
The jury was given eleient instructions on the charged 
offense and two lesser included offenses of unlawful 
control over a motor vehicle for an extended time and 
unlawful control over a motor vehicle (Instruction No. 5-7; 
R. 64-66). The jury was given four possible verdict forms. 
They could find defendant guilty of either the charged 
offense, one of the lesser included offenses or not guilty 
of any charge. 
C. Disposition at Trial Court 
Defendant was found guilty as charged of theft of an 
operable vehicle (R. 86). Defendant then admitted the 
habitual criminal allegation (T. 163-70). Defendant was 
referred to Adult Probation and Parole for a presentence 
investigation. On February 16, 1994 defendant was 
sentenced to serve an enhanced term in the Utah State 
Prison of five years to life (R. 89-91). 
D. Facts 
On November 22, 1993 Defendant took unauthorized 
possession of an operable vehicle, a red camaro, owned by 
Shontee Torres, from her home in floab, Grand County, Utah 
(T.108). Ginger Torres (Shontee's mother) testified that 
she noticed the vehicl e missing between 7:00 and 7:30 p.m. 
that evening (T. 64). Shontee became aware that the vehicle 
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ma3 missing when she came home between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m. 
(T. 69). That night defendant used the vehicle to drive to 
Grand Junction, Colorado, to help a friend move her 
possessions back to floab (T. 94, 108). The next day they 
drove back to rtoab and stopped at the local City Market to 
pick up some baby food (T. 109). The car was seen there 
and reported to the police and soon after reported to be 
parked in front a trailer where defendant mas located (T. 
103). This occurred at approximately 7:40 p.m. (T. 103). 
He had just finished unloading his friend's possessions 
from the car (T. 109). Uhen the officers arrived, 
defendant was scared and hid under a bed in the back of the 
trailer (T. 90). Uhen questioned by officers he admitted 
that he had taken the vehicle and that he was just getting 
ready to return the car to city park, a public park located 
near the owner's residence (T. 85, 95, 107). 
SUntlflRV OF flRGUrtEHTS 
The trial court erred in admitting the defendant's 
prior felony conviction for burglary under Rule 609(a)(1) 
by improperly determining that the probative value of the 
conviction outweighed its prejudicial effect and not 
excluding it as a similar crime. The court also erred in 
admitting the conviction under section 76-8-1002 which 
prohibits informing the jury of prior convictions that are 
the basis for the habitual criminal charge in the 
underlying felony trial. 
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The trial court also abused its discretion in failing 
to grant a mistrial when a prosecution witness testified 
that the defendant was on parole from prison at the time of 
his arrest. This statement especially in light of the 
admission of the prior conviction unfairly prejudiced the 
jury and denied defendant a fair trial, fls the outcome of 
the trial turned on the jury's assessment of defendant's 
credibility, absent these errors, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for defendant. 
There is insufficient evidence to support the 
defendant's conviction for theft of an operable motor 
vehicle, as a reasonable jury should have had a reasonable 
doubt as to that charge and found him guilty of the lesser 
included charge of unlawful control over a motor vehicle 
for an extended t ime. 
Defendant's conviction, therefore, should be reversed, 
and the case remanded to the district court for new trial 
or in the alternative the conviction should be reduced to 
unlawful control over motor vehicle for extended time and 
the case remanded for resentencing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error In 
Admitting Evidence of Defendant's Prior Felony 
Conviction. 
fl. Pursuant to Rule 609(a)(1), Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
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Under Utah Rules of Evidence, a felony or misdemeanor 
conviction is admissible, if: (1) the conviction involves 
dishonesty or false statement; or (2) the conviction is 
relevant to proving defendant's intent, motive, plan, 
opportunity and lack of mistake or accident. See Utah R. 
Evid. 609(a)(2), 404(b) I 403, respectively. See Addendum. 
Outside these two exceptions, the admission of prior 
crimes evidence is presumed prejudicial. State v. 
Saunders. 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985). Houever, Rule 
609(a)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence, does permit "an accused 
mho testifies in a criminal case on his own behalf: to be 
impeached by evidence of his prior felony convictions not 
inuoluing dishonesty or false statement if "the (trial) 
court determines that the probative value of admitting the 
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect." State v. 
Banner. 717 P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah 1986). In balancing the 
evidence's probative value against its prejudicial effect, 
the trial court must, at minimum, properly consider the 
five pronged Banner analysis. 
1. The Trial Court Improperly Found That 
Burglary Has Hot a Similar Crime. 
While the trial court did conduct a Banner analysis, 
it did not do so correctly. The court correctly stated the 
si milarity prong: 
The similarity to the charged crime, 'cause It 
bears on the prejudice, the—the rule of thumb is 
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that there would be a rare, rare case when a 
crime similar to what's being charged would be 
admissible, because it would—in the jury's mind, 
it would tend to overshadow everything else, 
(T. 119). 
Correctly, under the similar crime analysis, the court 
then excluded the possession of a 3tolen vehicle and 
larceny prior convictions. However, the court did not 
treat the burglary conviction the same way and continued 
with further admissibility analysis. The court held that 
the burglary conviction is "not similar to the charged 
crime. They're— the jury's not likely to look at It and 
say he's committed a burglary before, so therefore, he must 
have committed theft of an automobile. They're different 
kinds of crimes" (T. 122). The court's determination 
disregarded the fact that both crimes Involve the same 
intent, indeed theft can be a lesser included offense of 
burglary. 
In State v. Pitts. 728 P.2d 113 (Utah 1986), the 
Supreme Court addressed the relationship between burglary 
and theft in term3 of a lesser included instruction. The 
defendant argued the obvious relationship between burglary 
and theft because burglary involves the element of intent 
to commit theft. The 3tate argued that different "societal 
interests" mere protected at common law by each crime. 
Pitts. 728 P.2d at 115. The Court held that: 
The State'3 analysis Ignores the plain language 
of section 76-6-202(1), which includes the intent 
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to commit a theft in the definition of "burglary," 
. , . A significant relationship exists between 
these two offenses because the same specific 
intent 13 required for each. The fact that the 
intent to commit theft is not a necessary element 
of all burglaries does not obviate the relation-
ship between the two offenses in this case. 
Pitts.728 P.2d at 116. 
In addition to the fact that they are legally similar 
crimes; in the minds of the average person or juror, they 
are similar as they both Involve stealing. In fact the 
Supreme Court has characterized prior convictions for 
retail theft and attempted burglary as "stealing-type 
crimes." State v. Bruce. 779 P.2d 646 at 656 (Utah 1989). 
Despite the trial court's view, burglary is exactly the 
type of prior conviction that would make a juror conclude 
that defendant is guilty of theft, l.e, if he broke In some 
place and stole and kept other people's property before, he 
probably stole the car and was going to keep it too. This 
is particularly important given the significance of the 
intent issue; likely led the jury to determine that he 
intended to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle 
(keep the car) because he's a thief. 
While the court initially correctly found that 
burglary "is not a crime of testimonial dishonesty or false 
statement. That comes in no matter what under Rule 
609 ..." (T. 121). The court then basically treated it 
as such a crime: 
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the crime of burglary is one that indicates—It's 
on the—it's on the range of those that indicate 
a willingness to depart from the standards of 
society. It's—it's the kind of crime that—that 
involves oftentimes, some sort of—the use of 
subterfuge, it's done at night or it's done when 
people are unaware. It's kind of a—for lack of 
a better word, kind of a sneaky crime. 
(T. 121). The Court also found that "if he has done 
something in the past that indicates a willingness to 
depart from the standards of society, that may also mean 
that he's milling to depart from the standards of society 
by not telling the truth when he's on the witness stand" 
(T. 121). 
However, the Supreme Court has held that absent a 
showing that a prior burglary was committed by fraudulent 
or deceitful means bearing directly on the accused's 
likelihood to testify truthfully, it is not a crime of 
dishonesty or false statement and absent that showing, 
burglary does not "involve the credibility-deteriorating 
quality contemplated in the rule" [Rule 609(a)(2)]. Bruce. 
779 P.2d at 656. Absent that showing, a burglary 
conviction does not "bear directly on the likelihood that 
defendant will testify truthfully." Bruce., at 656 quoting 
United States v. Glenn. 667 F.2d 1269, 1273 (9th Cir. 
1982). In the present case there was absolutely no showing 
that the prior burglary mas committed by such fraudulent or 
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deceitful means which mould bear on defendant's 
credibiIity. 
Clearly the court's treatment of the burglary 
conviction unfairly impacted the defendant in light of the 
fact that the main rationale for admitting the conviction 
relied upon by both the prosecutor and court was that the 
conviction went directly to defendant's credibility. 
After reviewing record, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the result would have been different had 
defendant's prior conviction been excluded. The burglary 
conviction would be extremely prejudicial and tend to 
inflame the jury in a case involving a theft or stealing-
type crime. Defendant's testimony would have been more 
believable and influential had his credibility not been 
damaged by the prejudicial errors. 
2. The Trial Court Erred In Not Requiring 
Prosecutor To fleet His Burden of 
Establishing the Probativeness of the 
Burglary Convict ion. 
"It i3 universally held that the prosecution under 
Rule 609(a)(1) has the burden of persuading the court that 
the probative value of admitting the convictions, as far as 
shedding light on the defendant's credibility, outweighs 
the prejudicial effect to the defendant." Banner. 717 P.2d 
at 1334. Because other crimes evidence under rule 
609(a)(1) is presumed inadmissible, a trial court cannot 
abdicate its responsibility to determine the evidence's 
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probativene33, State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah 
1991). fl3 stated supra, the determination of probativenes3 
basically rested on the flamed suggestion that the burglary 
conuiction bore directly on defendant's credibility, fls 
di3cu33ed, 3upra, the crime of burglary does not inherently 
reflect on defendant'3 character for truth and veracity, 
Banner, 717 P.2d at 1334-35. 
During the state's case-in-chief, no evidence of 
defendant'3 prior crimes wa3 admitted, other than Brewer's 
parole comment (see infra Point II). Subsequently, 
defendant testified on hi3 own behalf. During direct 
defendant testified that he took the vehicle without 
permission and that he intended to return it (T. 107) 
During cross-examination defendant was asked mhether he had 
been convicted of a felony and answered yes (T. 116). 
Defense counsel objected and the jury was excused (T. 116) 
and the court proceeded to consider the admissibility of 
the prior crime evidence (T. 117-122). The prior 
conuictions were objected to on the basis of Section 76-8-
1002 (T. 116-17). Said objection was denied (T. 117-18). 
The court then conducted a rule 609 analysis (T. 118-22). 
The burden of establishing probativeness is on the 
prosecution. Banner. 717 P.2d at 1334. The trial court 
recognized the burden but did not require the prosecutor to 
meet it. Mr. Benge offered virtually no evidence that 
introduction of the conviction would be more probative than 
prejudicial. 
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rir. Benge: Vour honor, I just think that it — i t 
— i t just goes to the issue of his credibility, 
and the prejudicial factor, l~l can't say, I 
guess I'd leave that up to Sandra to argue, but 
it certainly, to me, if I were sitting on a jury, 
I would want to know if this person were a sweet 
innocent or if he—he had some reason to be 
fabricating this story. 
(T, 120). 
fls in Banner where the Utah Supreme Court found 
reversible error, the prosecutor In the instant case did 
not argue that the evidence of the felony conviction was 
more probative than prejudicial (T. 120). In fact he relied 
more on the prejudicial nature of it. 
Ms. Starley: His credibility, though, is a very 
important issue, and I think that it will be 
compromised by admitting the felony conviction. 
Mr. Benge: I agree that it would be compromised 
and that's the exact reason we're trying to get 
it in. 
(T. 120-21). 
The harmfulness of the error must next be considered. 
The credibility of defendant was central to his case as 
defendant did not deny his involvement, rather he denied 
having the intent to deprive the owner of "permanent" 
possession of the vehicle. 
During closing argument, the prosecutor repeatedly 
discussed the defendant's credibility and stated: 
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Rnd I want to ask you: Do you believe llr. 
Gauger? If you believe fir. Gauger, then perhaps 
you should find the defendant guilty to the 
unlawful control of a motor vehicle for an 
extended time, and that's your prerogative; but 
do you belive him? Did he intend to return that 
car? No. . . . 
Is a person to be believed mho had a phony 
I.D, on him, identifying him as Charles Cox? Rnd 
is a person to be believed mho's a convicted 
felon. 
fls the Judge stated, the fact that he's a 
convicted felon, in and of itself, is not any-
thing that means that you have to completely 
disrely, or disregard his testimony; but that, 
combined with everything else, I ask you, do you 
believe him? Or was it just too darn easy to 
say that? 
Would he have said the same thing if he were 
caught in three days and said, Oh, I meant to 
take it back, I was going to take It back to-
morrow, and then the next day, I was going to go 
and get the money and take it down. Or two week3 
later. It's too darn easy to explain yourself 
away after you get caught. . . . 
Do you believe fir. Gauger? If you do, find 
him guilty of the crime in Instruction 6, 
unlawful control over the motor vehicle for an 
extended time. If you don't find him guilty as 
charged. 
(T.157-58). 
The motive for the state to admit the conviction was 
to show that defendant is a bad person and should not be 
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believed. That is exactly how the conviction mas used at 
trial. The conviction was used to show criminal 
disposition as prohibited in Sounders, in effect arguing to 
the jury that defendant Is a criminal so he must have 
committed the crime at issue. 
In the present case, the impermissible analysis mas 
urged, as stated above, by the prosecutor's argument that 
defendant is a convicted felon, "do you believe him?" (T. 
158). These comments and the other listed supra, clearly 
urged the jury to view defendant as a person who commits 
crimes and to use this characteristic as evidence that he 
committed the charged crime. This is especially 
prejudicial in a less than strong case. 
Defendant's case rested on the jury's assessment of 
the believabiIity of his claim that he intended to return 
the vehicle. The prosecutor referred to defendant's prior 
criminal involvement during cross-examination and closing 
argument. Under these circumstances, it "is impossible to 
say that defendant's substantial rights were not affected 
by the (trial court's) error." Banner. 717 P.2d at 1334. 
"In close cases, the substantive use of a prior conviction 
can often tilt the balance in favor of conviction, 
particularly in the instant case, where (defendant's) 
character is at the heart of his defense." 
State v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992). 
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B. The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error 
in Concluding that Defendant's Felony 
Conviction was Admissible Despite Section 
76-8-1002(2), Utah Code Annotated. 
The relevant procedure for a felony jury trial with an 
habitual criminal charge is 03 follows: "If a jury is 
impaneled, it shall not be told of the previous felony 
convictions or charge of being a habitual criminal. The 
trial on the felony committed within the state of Utah 
shall proceed as in other cases." Section 76-8-1002(2) 
Utah Code. flnn. 1953, as amended. 
Defendant objected to the admission of his prior 
convictions under 76-8-1001,et seq. and the following 
exchange and analysis followed: 
Us. Star ley: Vour honor, under the habitual 
criminal code section, 78-8-101 (sic) it states 
that any crime that is, or conviction that is 
relied upon to charge the defendant mith habitual 
criminal cannot be brought up to the jury. 
find I believe from my review of his criminal 
history that all his felony convictions would 
have—would come under that. I believe all of 
them have been listed on the Information as the 
ones that the state is relying upon. 
fir. Benge: I tend to agree with the fact that I 
couldn't bring it up to the jury without—without 
his denying it; however, I still believe—I don't 
think that obviates my ability to ask him, for 
credibility purposes, whether he's been convicted 
of a felony and what felony and when. 
16 
The Court: Uell, I interpret that provision a s — 
as meaning nothing more than that during the 
trial on the underlying charge, where habitual 
criminal is—is also charged, that—that the jury 
will not receive information a3 to the prior 
convictions with regard to the habitual criminal 
charge, 30 that—so there's no cross-
contamination there. 
I don't interpret that as—as meaning that 
the rules that would ordinarily apply for intro-
duction of felony convictions to impeach a 
witness would—would be abrogated, so I think 
those— those rules are—the application of Rule 
609 or Rule 404(b) are not affected, not 
intended to be affected by that statute, and a 
reasonable reading of it, they would not be 
affected. 
So they're certainly not admissible to show 
that he'3 a habitual criminal at this stage; but 
if they're admissible for purposes of credibility 
when he takes the stand, they'd be admissible on 
the 3ame ba3i3 as in any other case, where—if 
they were admissible to show anything else under 
Rule 404(b). 
(T. 116-18). 
The Court's and prosecution analysis while relying on 
an allegedly "reasonable reading" of the statute is flawed, 
fl plain reading of the statute is that the jury is not to 
be told of the prior felony convictions (referring to the 
felony convictions specified in the information and relied 
upon for the habitual charge) or the habitual charge. If 
that section only meant that the prior felony convictions 
could not be mentioned unless admissible under a Rule 404 
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or 609 analysis then the questioned language would be 
clearly superfluous and unnecessary, as a statute that said 
only that jury should not be told of the habitual charge 
would have the 3ame effect, It appears that the legislature 
ha3 chosen to require a different standard regarding prior 
convictions in case3 where the prosecutor alleges the 
defendant to be a habitual criminal. 
Uhile this issue appears to be a case of first 
impression in Utah, defendant urges a plain reading of the 
statute as outlined supra. 
The same analysis of harm as discussed supra in 
section fl applies to this error. Clearly the admission of 
the prior conviction substantially affected the jury's 
verdict, l-lithout said admission there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable verdict for defendant. 
POINT II 
The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error by 
Refusing to Grant Defendant a Mistrial on the 
Ground that Brewer's Testimony i»a3 Prejudicial. 
fl trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial will 
be upheld unless the court abused its discretion. To 
warrant reversal defendant must 3how that testimony is so 
prejudicial as to deny him a fair trial. State v. Burk. 
839 P.2d 880, 883-84 (Utah Rpp. 1992). "In the absence of 
the appearance of something persuasive to the contrary, we 
assume that the jurors were conscientious in performing to 
their duty, and that they followed the instructions of the 
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court." Burk. 839 P.2d at 883 quoting State v, Hodges. 517 
P.2d 1322, 1324 (Utah 1974). 
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial; 
If it has a tendency to influence the outcome of 
the trial by improper means, or if it appeals to 
the jury's sympathies, or arouses its sense of 
horror, provokes its instinct to punish or other-
wise causes a jury to base its decision on some-
thing other than the established propositions of 
the case. 
Burk. 839 P.2d at 883, quoting Terry v. Zions C O O P . 
Hercantile Inst.. 605 P.2d 314, 323 n. 31 (Utah 1979). The 
parole comment clearly was inadmissible and unfairly 
prejudicial under the above standard. Hearing the the 
defendant has been in prison arouses the jury's sense of 
horror and provokes its instinct punish and causes a jury 
to base its decision on a non-established proposition of 
the case. The statement most likely had a strong impact on 
the jury as most people feel that a person has to do a lot 
or something really bad to be sent to prison. Also, the 
average person feels that someone mho has gone to prison, 
gets out and then is involved mith the police again, needs 
to be locked up for a long time. 
The impact of "the testimony might be compared to a 
drop of ink placed in a vessel of milk. It cannot long be 
seen, but it surely remains there to pollute its contents." 
Pearce v. Uistisen, 701 P.2d 489 at 494 (Utah 1985). In 
light of the admission the burglary conviction and the 
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inherent prejudicial nature of the mention of prison while 
the jury would probably try to disregard the comment but 
would find it impossible to ignore it in a case where the 
prosecution relied so heavily on discrediting the 
defendant. 
In the closest case in point, State v. Uelarde. a 
three day murder trial, a state witness stated he knew 
defendant "in jail". State v. Uelarde, 734 P.2d 440 at 448 
(Utah 1986). Defense counsel objected, uias overruled and 
the court denied the motion for mistrial. Court held that 
prejudice was involved, but that prejudice must be unfair. 
The court held that a "single phrase, clearly elicited 
inadvertently, made during a three-day trial . . . would be 
treated as harmless error absent a showing that it had a 
substantial influence in bringing about the verdict." 
Uelarde. 734 P.2d at 448. 
The present case differs from Uelarde. for while the 
parole statement was a single phrase, the trial was 
concluded in less than a full day, and in conjunction with 
the admission of his prior felony conviction, it clearly 
had a substantial impact on the jury, fl reference to 
prison is much more prejudicial than a reference to jail. 
Such a comment is especially influential in a case where 
defendant's credibility and intent are the ultimate issue 
and defendant's right to a fair trial is also impacted by 
admission of a prior conviction. 
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POINT III 
The Evidence Is Insufficient to Support 
Defendant's Conviction for Theft of an Operable 
flotor Uehicle. 
The state produced insufficient evidence to establish 
that defendant obtained unauthorized control over a motor 
vehicle with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof as 
required for a conviction for theft of an operable motor 
vehicle. The standard for review of such a claim is as 
follows: 
In dealing with a claim of insufficiency of 
the evidence, "(T)he evidence and the reasonable 
inferences which might be drawn therefrom must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury 
verdict. R jury conviction is reversed for 
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so 
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable mind3 must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted." 
State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989) accord 
State v. Jonas. 793 P.2d 902, 905 (Utah flpp. 1990). 
Uiewing the evidence in light most favorable to the 
verdict, there is evidence that defendant had unauthorized 
control of the vehicle, that the defendant did not return 
the vehicle within 24 hours after the exercise of 
unauthorized control which satisfies the elements of the 
lesser included offense of unauthorized control O V P " a 
motor vehicle for an extenJed time. Htnever, there is no 
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substantial euidence that defendant had purpose to deprive 
a required element for theft of an operable vehicle. The 
evidence is inconclusive and improbable to support the 
conviction. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401 defines purpose to deprive 
and list three circumstances in uihich purpose to deprive 
may be found as an element of theft under § 76-6-404. In 
the instant case, the jury instruction given listed all 
three opt ions. 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" mean3 to have the conscious 
object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so 
extended a period or to use under such circumstances 
that a substantial portion of Its economic value, or 
of the use and benefit thereof, mould be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of 
a reward or other compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property under 
circumstances that make it unlikely that the owner 
will recover it. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-401(3). The State did not Introduce 
sufficient evidence showing that defendant's acts satisfied 
the statutory definition of purpose to deprive. 
The prosecutor acknowledged that it is unknown whether 
defendant acted with purpose to deprive. "Uell, did this 
happen? Uell, in a way, we really don't know" (T. 143). 
He went on to state the things that might have happened, 
had the vehicle not been recovered uihen it was. This 
argument was on basec on conjecture and speculation. The 
only conclusive and logical evidence the jury could rely 
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upon mas defendant's initial statements and a commonsense 
evaluation of the fact that from the first moment defendant 
mas asked about the uehicle (a time where he wasn't in a 
very good position to come up with a story, having just 
been discovered hiding under a bed) he stated that he 
intended to leave the vehicle to a place where it mas 
likely to be recovered. That testimony directly counters 
the element of purpose to depriue argued by prosecutor, 
that of disposing of the property under circumstances that 
would make it unlikely that the owner mill recover it. 
Also, the circumstances of defendant's use of vehicle 
were inconsistent mith the intent or purpose to deprive. 
Defendant drove the vehicle outside of Utah and returned in 
it to floab and unloaded all his friend's possessions. This 
is consistent with the intent to use temporarily not the 
intent to permanently depriue. If defendant was going to 
dispose of the uehicle in may that would make it unlikely 
that it mould be recouered, he would not driue to another 
state and then return to small tomn in a highly visible 
vehicle (red camaro) that had most likely been reported as 
stolen. 
In fact the prosecutor acknowledged that the jury 
couid find the defendant guilty of the lesser charge: "you 
sure as heck could find him guilty of unlawful control of a 
motor uehicle ouer an extended period of time. He did 
exercise unauthorized control and he did not reiurn the 
motor uehicle within 24 hours" (T. i44). 
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The prosecutor misstated the "purpose to deprive" 
element when he argued that the defendant "by his own 
testimony, which you may believe or disbelieve, he never 
intended to return the vehicle to the owner" (T. H 5 ) , The 
required element, as cited supra, is not whether defendant 
intended to return the vehicle directly to owner, but 
whether the defendant intended to dispose of property under 
circumstances that would make it unlikely to be recovered, 
Defendant "by his own testimony" intended to dispose of the 
property in a way that would make it likely to be 
recovered, 
Given the evidence presented in this case, defendant 
is entitled to have his conviction reduced from theft of an 
operable motor vehicle to unauthorized control of a motor 
vehicle for an extended period and the case remanded to 
trial court for resentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
The above discussed errors of the trial court in 
conjunction with the insufficient evidence deprived the 
defendant of his right to a fair trial. Especially when 
looked at as a whole, it is clear that defendant's 
conviction should be reversed and the case remanded for a 
new trial or the conviction reduced to unauthorized control 
of motor vehicle for an extended time and the case remanded 
for resentencing. 
V* 
24 
Respectfully submitted this I t day of July, 1994. 
L 
Sandra U, Star ley 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Annotated. Section 76-6-404. Theft-Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control 
over the property of another with a purposes to deprive him thereof. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-8-1001. Habitual Criminal-
Determination 
Any person who has been twice convicted, sentenced, and committed 
for felony offenses at least one of which offenses having been at least a 
second degree felony or a crime which, if committed within this state would 
have been a capital felony, first degree felony, or second degree felony, and 
was committed to any prison may, upon conviction of at least a second 
degree felony committted in this state, other than aggravated murder or 
murder, be determined as a habitual crimnal and be imprisoned in the state 
prison for from five years to life. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-8-1002. Habitual Criminal-
Procedure—Punishment. 
(1) In charging a person with being a habitual criminal, the 
(2) If the defendant is bound over to the district court for trial, the 
county attorney or district attorney shall in the information or complaint 
specify the felony committed within the state of Utah and the two or more 
previous felony convictions relied upon for the charge of being a habitual 
criminal. If a jury is impaneled, it shall not be told of the previous felony 
convictions or charge of being a habitual cirmnal. The trial on the felony 
committed within the state of Utah shall proceed as in other cases. 
(3) If the court or jury finds the defendant guilty of the felony 
charged, then the defendant shall be tried immediately by the same judge or 
jury, if a jury was impaneled, on the charge of being a habitual criminal, 
unless the defendant has entered or enters a plea of guilty to the charge of 
being a habitual criminal. 
(4) No conviction may be admissible to establish the status of a 
habitual criminal if it was set aside on the basis of the defendant's innocence. 
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime. 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 
i, 1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been 
convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, the crime 
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under 
the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an 
accused has been convicted of such a cirme s>.all be admitted if the court 
?. 
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
Rule 26(2)(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
UJ Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may 
be taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with 
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as 
otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the 
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take 
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the 
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate 
court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other 
sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-1-6. Rights of defendant. 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(f) 
Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony. 
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